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The rapid development of digital technologies is having a profound
effect on shaping international law in general, and international dispute
settlement in particular.
A defining characteristic of digital technologies is their ability to
transcend territorial boundaries. Legal disputes implicating these
technologies thus challenge the unfettered jurisdictional competence of any
single nation state, and complicate the application and enforcement of
existing legal rules. Whenever national laws are not entirely harmonized, or
conflicts of law principles do not invariably lead to the choice of a single
jurisdiction's law, national governments and private parties come under
pressure to develop new international mechanisms to cut through the
complex, cross-border legal disputes that digital technologies engender.
Nowhere have these dispute settlement pressures created more
controversy than in intellectual property law. Intellectual property rights are
at the heart of cyberspace. They protect the computer code that forms the
architecture of cyberspace-the text, images, and sounds that comprise the
bulk of content online, and the symbols that guide consumers through the
maze of e-businesses.' But the very same technologies that make intellectual
property rights an increasingly pervasive part of a digitally networked world
* Professor of Law and Lloyd Tevis Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Copyright
2001, Laurence R. Helfer. This article was written for the International Law Weekend West
Symposium held at Pepperdine University School of Law on January 26-27, 2001.
1. See generally WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, REPORT: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE (1995); American Bar Association Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project,
Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created
by the Internet 120-31 (July 11, 2000) (copy on file with author); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
also enable infringements of those rights on a massive scale, generating new
tensions between intellectual property owners and users over the allocation
of legal entitlements and the proper definition of legitimate, non-infringing
on-line activities.2
At the center of this growing controversy is the Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP"),3 a new non-national' procedure
governing a narrow class of conflicts between the owners of internet domain
names5 and the owners of trademarks.' The UDRP was established by a
private, non-profit corporation, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN") in late 1999. It creates a fast and inexpensive
online dispute settlement system that allows trademark owners to recapture
domain names held by persons who, in bad faith, register and use domain
names that are confusingly similar to their marks.7
2. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws And The (Non-National)
Domain Name System, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 495 (2000) (discussing the expanding series of
conflicts between national trademark system and non-national domain name system); Neil W.
Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441 (1997) (discussing the impact of international treaties on scope of copyright
protection required to be adopted by national governments); Shira Perlmutter, Future Directions in
International Copyright Law, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369 (1998) (discussing the flexibility
national legislators enjoy in creating exceptions to exclusive rights enjoyed by copyright owners).
3. See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (August 26, 1999), at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2001) [hereinafter Policy].
4. This essay uses the term "non-national" to refer to lawmaking and dispute settlement
structures that arise outside the sphere in which the nation state operates (both internally and in its
relations with other states). Such non-national structures can have several institutional components,
including hybridized rules drawn from different legal systems and the use of privatized technological
controls to enforce rules. For a more detailed discussion, see Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 141 (2001).
5. The UDRP applies principally to domain names registered in three generic top level domain
names ("gTLDs"), ".com," ".net," and ".org." See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, General Information, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2001). In
addition, registrars for a few country code top level domains ("ccTLDs") have agreed to apply the
UDRP to trademark-domain name disputes. See http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/cctld/index.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2001) (listing 22 ccTLDs applying UDRP).
6. The UDRP was deliberately designed to address only a limited set of controversies between
trademark owners and domain name registrants, notably "deliberate, bad faith, abusive, domain
name registrations or 'cybersquatting,"' and to exclude "disputes between parties with competing
rights acting in good faith." World Intellectual Property Organization, Final Report of the WIPO
Internet Domain Name Process 135 (Apr. 30, 1999), at http://wipo2.wipo.int/processl/report/
index.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2001) [hereinafter WIPO Final Report]; see also Second Staff Report
on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 (Oct. 24, 1999), at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2001)
(stressing that UDRP was limited to "'abusive registrations' made with bad-faith intent to profit
commercially from others' trademarks (e.g., cybersquatting and cyberpiracy)"); J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 25.69.1, 25.77 (1999) (defining
cybersquatting as "the conduct of one who reserves with a network information center a domain
name consisting of the mark or name of a company for the purpose of relinquishing the right to that
domain name back to the legitimate owner for a price.").
7. In brief, the UDRP requires a domain name registrant to submit to an on-line dispute
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There are at least two important reasons why this new dispute settlement
mechanism is worthy of serious study. First and foremost, the process by
which the UDRP was created, and the way in which it is structured, departs
significantly from preexisting approaches to international dispute settlement,
not only for intellectual property rights but also for international law
generally. These differences in creation and structure raise questions about
the UDRP's legitimacy and, as a result, the legitimacy of the case law it
produces.8
However, these differences also raise a second and larger concern. The
UDRP has been operating for a short time, but national and international
lawmakers are already heralding it as a model for resolving a much broader
set of transnational legal problems.9 Although certain aspects of the UDRP
are worthy of emulation, in this essay I sound a note of caution and ask some
hard questions about how such non-national dispute settlement systems
ought to be structured. In particular, I focus on the mechanisms used to
control the limited power granted to non-national dispute settlement decision
makers.
settlement proceeding whenever a complaining trademark owner asserts that: (a) the registrant's
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the complainant's trademark or service mark; (b)
the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name; and (c) the domain name has
been registered and is being used in bad faith. The UDRP provides a non-exclusive list of instances
of bad faith registration and use, as well as a list of the potential grounds for the registrant to
establish its rights or legitimate interests in the domain name. For discussions of how UDRP panels
have interpreted these key provisions, see Diane Cabell, Overview of Domain Name Policy
Development, at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/udrp/overview.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2001); Dori
Kornfeld, Evaluating the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icannpressingissues2000/briefingbook/udrp-review.htmi (last visited
Jan. 8, 2001).
8. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 600, 601 n.29 (1999) (defining
legitimacy as "a quality that leads people (or states) to accept authority-independent of coercion,
self-interest, or rational persuasion-because of a general sense that the authority is justified" and
citing other definitions); see also Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination:
A Domain Name Case Study, 74 IND. L.J. 587, 603 (1999) (arguing that informal and participatory
consensus model used to adopt Internet's technical standards is ill suited to public policy questions
such as the structure and ownership of the domain name system).
9. See, e.g., Victoria Carrington, Internet Needs Fast, Fair Dispute Resolution Process, THE
LAW. WKLY., Nov. 17, 2000 (asking "whether the UDRP system that is now confined to bad faith
registrations ought to be and/or is capable of being expanded to include a broader range of
intellectual property disputes that take place on the Internet"); Subcommittee Tackles Jurisdiction
Issues on Internet, 60 PAT. TRAD. COPR. J. (BNA) 214, 215 (July 14, 2000) (reporting testimony
before House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property which
"debated the usefulness of the [UDRP] ... as a possible model for resolving complex jurisdictional
issues"); Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, supra note 1, at 1.4.7 (describing UDRP as a
"promising example" for creating "new forms of dispute resolution" by private parties and
governmental bodies for Internet disputes that cross national borders).
II. THE TENSIONS OF TECHNOLOGY, TERRITORY,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
To appreciate why the UDRP is both novel and also potentially
problematic requires an understanding of how the Internet's seemingly
borderless world"0 challenges the territorial nature of national intellectual
property laws, and trademark laws in particular.
First, the words and phrases designating Internet computer servers
function as both names and as addresses-that is, they both locate and
identify Internet resources. This duality has caused simple, easy-to-
remember domain names to acquire significant commercial value as source
identifiers for goods and services." Yet the first-come-first-served system
for registering domain names means that trademark owners frequently do
not own names that parallel, to greater or lesser degrees, their preexisting
marks.
The second challenge relates to the overlapping legislative and judicial
competencies fostered by cyberspace. Although domain name owners create
web sites with a global online presence, that presence creates significant
offline spillover effects in many national jurisdictions. The result has been a
clash of dueling lawmaking and adjudicatory competencies, both
horizontally between different national legislatures and courts, and vertically
between national and international bodies.'2
Dealing with the domestic effects of transborder conduct is hardly a new
phenomenon, however. In fact, it dates back to the founding of intellectual
property treaties in the late nineteenth century." Under that system, now
incorporated into the World Trade Organization, 4 governments dealt with
10. I use the word seemingly because efforts are underway to develop technologies that will "re-
territorialize" the Internet by differentiating among users, online data, and online resources
according to their country of origin. See, e.g., Steve Bonisteel, JumpTV Aims To Be Next
iCraveTV-Without Lawsuits, NEWSBYTES, Sept. 15, 2000 (discussing proposal of Canadian
company to retransmit off-the-air television signals via the Internet, an act that is legal in Canada but
amounts to copyright infringement in the United States, by "sealing off access to Web surfers from
countries such as the U.S."); Digital Island, at
http://www.digisle.net/services/app-serv/traceware.shtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2001) (discussing a
commercial service called TraceWhere that purports to map web traffic to country of origin with
96% accuracy).
11. See Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Jnfobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law of
Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 30 (1995); Marshall Leaffer, Domain Names, Globalization
and Internet Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139, 145 (1998-99) (finding that domain
names "serve a useful purpose by designating where information is to be sent [as well as]... they
often indicate origin, and [are] view[ed] ... as trademarks.").
12. See Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 495-96.
13. See generally G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (1968); SAM RICKETSON, THE
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986 (1987).
14. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125.
[Vol. 29: 87, 2001] International Dispute Settlement
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
transborder problems not by developing a global intellectual property code
or court, but instead by adopting a more decentralized approach. They
consigned the day-to-day enforcement of intellectual property rights to
private party actions before national courts applying domestic laws and
conflicts rules, and reserved more serious, systemic problems for treaty-
based state-to-state dispute settlement.'5 This approach functioned rather
well when the key acts of intellectual property infringement could be
localized within national borders, but it has proved a cumbersome way to
address the rapid-paced, multi-jurisdictional conflicts that digital
technologies engender.
In part, the UDRP was developed in response to this inadequacy, and in
that sense it does reflect an advance over the existing system. The UDRP
has four principal virtues: it is simple, cheap, quick, and easily accessible by
parties located anywhere in the world.'6 Digital filings of pleadings are the
norm. The total cost of a proceeding ranges between $750 and $2,500 per
domain name. And most decisions are published on the Internet forty-five
days after a complaint is filed.'7 These are significant improvements over
the expenses and delays of litigating trans-national intellectual property
claims in domestic courts.
15. See Laurence R. Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The
Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 367 (1998).
16. See WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Geographical Distribution of Parties 2000, at
http://arbiter.wipo.intldomains/statistics/2000/countries.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2001) (identifying
nationality of all complainants and respondents to UDRP proceedings conducted by WIPO). On
matters of substance, issues are significantly more complex. The UDRP contains an autonomous set
of rules for determining when trademark owners can recapture domain names from their registered
owners. These rules are distinct from any single national trademark statute, although they do not
preclude UDRP panels from consulting and applying one or more national trademark laws if they so
choose. See Uniform Domain Name 'Dispute Resolution Policy 15(a), at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2001) [hereinafter UDRP
Rules]. The overlap between the UDRP and national trademark laws is also an unsettled question.
See, e.g., Barbara Solomon, Two New Tools to Combat Cyberpiracy - A Comparison, 90
TRADEMARK REP. 679 (2000) (comparing substantive and remedial aspects of the UDRP with the
United States Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).
17. For details concerning the costs and procedural rules of each of the four UDRP dispute
settlement providers, see WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/rules/supplemental.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2001); National
Arbitration Forum, at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/domain-rulesO2OlOl.asp (last visited Dec.
7, 2001); eResolution Online Dispute Resolution Services, at http://www.eresolution.ca/services/
dnd/pjr/supprules.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2001); and Center for Public Resources, at
http://www.cpradr.org/ICANNRulesAndFees.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
III. SITUATING DOMAIN NAME CONTROVERSIES IN CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:
IDENTIFYING THE UDRP's PROBLEMS
Although the UDRP's procedural advantages are considerable, it is also
essential to understand its problematic aspects. These include the manner in
which this new dispute settlement system was created, as well as certain
ways in which the system's structure differs from preexisting models of
international dispute settlement.
Consider first the process by which international dispute settlement
bodies are created and why that process exists. Whether we are speaking of
international tribunals or arbitral centers, these bodies are formed through a
process of deliberative construction.'" That is, they are slowly and carefully
built, often over years, by negotiators haggling over such issues as the
subject matter of disputes, the procedures for adjudicating them, the parties
who can bring claims, and the decision makers who will rule on those
claims.
One important explanation for this slow pace is the link between
legitimacy and the consensualist nature of international legal obligations.
Treaties bind governments only if they choose to be bound; and private
parties negotiating arbitration agreements freely select from different arbitral
institutions or ad hoc rules to resolve their future disputes. Fine-tuning
obligations and the mechanisms for their enforcement takes time and allows
for the airing of diverse viewpoints. But the very fact that those affected by
a dispute settlement regime have a choice about its structure (or indeed
whether they are bound by it at all) serves a crucial legitimating function. If
international authority is largely self-imposed, then it is also largely
uncontroversial."9 This is particularly true in countries like the United States,
in which international treaties become effective only after democratically-
elected legislative bodies ratify them.2°
Yet any time authority is delegated to a dispute settlement institution,
there is a risk that that authority will be misapplied or abused in specific
cases. So a second reason for deliberative construction is that governments
18. See Kal Raustiala, Democracy, Sovereignty, and the Slow Pace of International Negotiations,
8 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 3, 3-4 (1996) (noting the slow pace of international negotiation and
lawmaking); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing the Public International Legal
System, 88 Ky. L.J. 885, 896 (1999-2000) ("'he actual process of treaty negotiation begins with
months or even years of preparatory work.").
19. See Paul B. Stephan III, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 237, 245 (2000) (distinguishing on democratic accountability grounds between customary
international rules created by courts and "institutional international law" whose rules and institutions
are shaped by popularly elected legislative and executive bodies).
20. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring consent of two thirds of Senate to ratify treaties).
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and private parties spend significant time adopting checking mechanisms to
control the power of dispute settlement decision makers."
These checking mechanisms vary in different dispute settlement
systems. In international arbitration, checks are imposed both ex ante,
through the parties' selection of the arbitral panel and the rules it will apply,
and more narrowly ex post, through review by national courts asked to
enforce arbitral awards." International adjudication is somewhat different
because of its effect on state actors, but here too national governments use
both formal and informal mechanisms to thwart the effect of problematic
rulings. Appeals to higher tribunals, procedures that permit losing parties to
"block" decisions from becoming binding, and delays, or even outright
refusals to implement a decision, are just a few examples.23
Compare this account of established forms of international dispute
settlement to both the creation and the structure of the UDRP. With respect
to creation issues, the UDRP was constructed in just under two years from
an embryonic proposal by the United States Commerce Department, to a
study by the UN-based World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"),
with final revisions and implementation by ICANN. '
Of course, a faster pace of international lawmaking is not necessarily
problematic, particularly where rapidly evolving digital technologies are
concerned. But the UDRP's adoption was more than just speedy. Unlike
prior intellectual property regimes, the UDRP emerged from a semi-private
rulemaking process which avoided many of the safeguards that have
accompanied such rulemaking in the past."
Specifically, WIPO acted upon a request from one national government
agency to develop a dispute settlement proposal that was submitted not to
21. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
ARBITRATION 1-7 (1992).
22. See generally ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1999).
23. See, e.g., David Palmeter, National Sovereignty and the World Trade Organization, 2 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 77, 80-81 (1999) (discussing WTO dispute settlement procedures); REISMAN,
supra note 21, at 15 (discussing International Court of Justice). For recent examples of delaying
tactics with respect to intellectual property norms, see Ravi Kanth, WFO Arbitrator Gives Canada
Until Oct. 7 to Comply With Drug Stockpiling Decision, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1313, 1314
(Aug. 24, 2000) (outlining WTO arbitrator's rejection of Canada's request for fifteen-month period
to implement TRIPs panel's pharmaceutical patent ruling and imposing six-month period instead).
24. See Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-Name
Dispute-Resolution Policy, at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last visited Jan. 10,
2001).
25. A. Michael Froomkin, Semi-Private International Rulemaking: Lessons Learned from the
WIPO Domain Name Process (Aug. 26, 1999), at http://www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/
TPRC99.pdf (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
other national governments as a model for voluntary adoption, nor to a
governmental conference negotiating a new intellectual property treaty to be
ratified by elected legislatures, but rather to a new private corporation with
its own rulemaking powers. This was an act of collaboration between public
and private entities quite unlike WIPO's historical role. And it was an
approach that avoided many of the political buffers that slow down public
international negotiations and implementation and permit diverse
perspectives to be aired. It is not surprising, then, notwithstanding efforts by
WIPO and ICANN to create a transparent rulemaking and comment
process,26 that the UDRP's formation was unduly rushed and heavily
dominated by intellectual property interests." The result, some observers
charge, is a UDRP that is structurally biased in favor of trademark owners.28
This result should not suggest that a private, non-national dispute
settlement system can never supplement state-based systems of adjudication.
But for such a system to function legitimately, at least two features must be
satisfied. First, the private parties affected by the system must have
significant involvement in developing the regime's mandatory rules, or at
least a meaningful ability to challenge the results in particular cases.
Second, national governments, whose trademark and unfair competition
laws are very much affected by non-national domain name adjudication,
must have opportunities to contribute to the system's substantive outcomes.
However, the UDRP is deficient in both of these areas. First, the UDRP
eliminates the negotiations and party autonomy of international arbitration
and substitutes for it a mandatory system for domain name owners. When
an individual registers a generic top-level domain name anywhere in the
world, she is contractually bound to accept the jurisdiction of UDRP panels
when any trademark owner invokes it. She cannot alter the subject matter of
disputes, she cannot select the dispute settlement provider that will hear her
case, and she has only limited avenues to challenge panel excesses or
26. See WIPO Final Report, supra note 6, N 26-31 & Annexes 1 & IM; ICANN Public
Comment Forum, at http://www.icann.org/comments-mail/comment-udrp/current/maillist.html (last
visited April 12, 2001),
27. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, A Commentary on WIPO's The Management of Internet
Names and Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues (May 19, 1999), at
http://www.law.miami.edu/-amf/commentary.htm; Milton Mueller, Technology and Institutional
Innovation: Internet Domain Names, 5 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 16-22 (2000); see also
William New, WIPO on Defensive For Domain-name Dispute Decisions, NAT'L J. TECH. DAILY
(Dec. 11, 2000).
28. The outcome of panel decisions in the first year of the UDRP's operation appears to confirm
this result. See Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution
Policy, at http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.pdf at 12 (last visited Jan. 9, 2001) (noting that trademark
owners have prevailed in 80% of UDRP panel decisions); see also id. at 2-31 (using statistical
analysis of first 621 UDRP decisions to demonstrate that the rule permitting trademark owners to
choose which dispute settlement provider will hear their complaint allows complainants to forum
shop for providers more likely to rule in their favor).
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errors.29 This eliminates the autonomy of traditional international arbitration,
in which the parties control arbitral power by painstakingly negotiating the
terms of their arbitration agreement. Of course, ICANN's rulemaking
process itself might function as a reasonable proxy for such individualized
negotiation. But if the rules that result from that process are skewed, or if
the process itself is open to challenge on legitimacy grounds, then the global
arbitral bargain struck by ICANN is itself questionable."
Second, unlike international arbitration and adjudication, the UDRP
contains its own built-in compliance scheme that effectively side steps state-
based enforcement mechanisms. For example, if a UDRP panel decides in
favor of a trademark owner, its ruling is directly enforced by a domain name
registrar who cancels the respondent's domain name or transfers ownership
of it to the complainant.3' Nominally, the respondent can stay enforcement
by commencing an action in a national court of so-called "mutual
jurisdiction" within ten business days. But this brief ten-day window, the
difficulty and expense of filing a complaint in what is often a foreign
jurisdiction, and the uncertain subject matter basis for such a proceeding is
likely to make national court review a rarity.33
What are the consequences of infrequent national court review? One
interpretation is that UDRP panelists are deciding cases correctly, obviating
the need for such review. This is likely to be true in cases of core domain
29. See Policy, supra note 3, 4a; Cabell, supra note 7; Kornfeld, supra note 7; see also Second
Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (The Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), 4.15, (Oct. 24, 1999) ("The provider.., for each
dispute would be determined by the complainant, which would submit its complaint to the selected
provider."), at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2001).
30. See Draft Yokohama Statement on Civil Society and ICANN Elections (The Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), In 1, 4, (July 1, 2001), at
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/civil-society-and-icannelections.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2001); Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187 (2000).
31. Policy, supra note 3, 1I 3(c), 4(i).
32. ld. at 4(k). In addition, the UDRP does not preclude either of the contesting parties from
filing a complaint in a national court before a UDRP complaint is filed, during a UDRP proceeding,
or after a UDRP panel has issued its decision. See BroadBridge Media LLC v. Hypercd.com, 168 F.
Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg.
Supply Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766, 1768 (N.D. II1. 2000) (recognizing that trademark owner filed
complaint in United States district court one day after filing UDRP complaint-court stayed its
decision pending ruling of UDRP panel).
33. See Hearing on Internet Domain Names Before the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, (Feb. 8, 2001) (testimony by Dr.
Vinton G. Cerf, Chairman of ICANN), available at 2001 WL 2005949 ("Even though the UDRP is
non-binding.., it appears that [court challenges] ha[ve] happened in only a few dozen out of over
2,000 decisions to date.").
name abuses. However, in other decisions panels have construed the UDRP
expansively in favor of trademark owners, even when that requires a strained
reading (or even a misreading) of the Policy's text.3" As one panel recently
cautioned, "distasteful conduct [by domain name owners] should not
stampede UDRP decision makers into an unwarranted expansion of the...
dispute process."35  These expansive (and unreviewed) decisions are
especially troubling when they address issues that WIPO and ICANN are
only now reviewing as potential legislative expansions of the UDRP.
IV. TOWARD SOME FIRST STEPS FORWARD
So where do we go from here, given the problems just identified? I see
two ways of proceeding. The first involves making incremental changes to
the UDRP in light of the experience generated during its first two years. But
the second and more important question concerns whether even an
appropriately revised UDRP can serve as a model to be applied to the many
other trans-border legal problems that cyberspace is generating.
As to tinkering with the UDRP, the ball is now in ICANN's court. In
the coming months, a panel of stakeholders and experts appointed by
ICANN will review the UDRP's performance and will consider if reforms of
the dispute settlement system are warranted.36 ICANN will also address
whether to expand the UDRP in light of the report and recommendations of
the Second WIPO Domain Name Process. 7
I believe that reform and expansion must go hand in hand. The system
is too new and its legitimacy too fragile to burden it with a broader
jurisdiction without also conducting a thorough review of issues that critics
have identified as problematic. 8 These issues include eliminating the forum
shopping incentives created by the current method of selecting dispute
34. See Mueller, supra note 28, at 23 (containing a list of some of the most problematic panel
rulings in the UDRP's first year, and discussing seven "really bad decisions"); see also Springsteen
v. Burgar, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, at 5 (Jan. 25, 2001) ("This Panel believes that previous
Panels have all too readily concluded that the mere registration of the mark [as a domain name]...
is evidence of an attempt to prevent the legitimate owner of registered or common law trade mark
rights from obtaining a 'corresponding domain name.',).
35. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104, I 6A
(Nov. 23, 2000) (stating that "[t]he UDRP has a narrow scope [and is not meant] ... to provide a
general remedy for all misconduct involving domain names.").
36. See Names Council Selects UDRP Task Force Members, ICANN Watch Aug. 27, 2001,
available at http://www.icannwatch.org/article.php?sid=317 (last visited December 28, 2001).
37. See World Intellectual Property Organization, The Recognition of Rights and the Use of
Names in the Internet Domain Name System, Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name
Process, (Sept. 3, 2001), http://wipo2.wipo.int (last visited December 28, 2001).
38. At a minimum, ICANN should not extend the UDRP's subject matter to anything other than
core cybersquatting and other abusive registration disputes until it conducts a thorough review of the
UDRP's performance.
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settlement providers;39 reviewing the system's choice of law rule to clarify
the relationship between the UDRP, national intellectual property laws, and
treaty rules;"0 and considering whether the costs and delays involved in
creating a UDRP appellate tribunal are outweighed by the need to resolve
the growing number of inconsistent decisions."
39. Milton Mueller's study of the first 621 UDRP decisions concludes that "forum shopping and
bias" have resulted from the UDRP rule allowing the trademark owner to choose the dispute
settlement provider:
There is statistical evidence that selection of dispute resolution service providers by
challengers leads to forum shopping that biases the results. There are major differences
among arbitration providers in the ratio of successful to unsuccessful challenges.... Both
NAF and WIPO tend to interpret the UDRP in ways that favor trademark holders over
other Internet users, whereas eResolutions decisions tend to adhere more closely to the
strict language of the policy.
Mueller, supra note 28, at 2;- see also Comments of David Post to ICANN Staff & Council
Regarding UDRP, 3 (Oct. 11, 1999) (predicting that granting trademark owners the right to choose
ICANN-accredited dispute settlement provider creates incentives for providers to rule in favor of
trademark owners). Mueller's proposed solution to this problem is to allow domain name registrars
to select the dispute settlement provider to hear disputes over the names they register. See Mueller,
supra note 28, at 21. But see ICANN Staff Report: Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy for gTLD
Registrars (Aug. 14, 1999) (rejecting this option prior to adoption of UDRP on the ground that it
"creates a (perhaps irresistible) potential for registrars to seek to differentiate themselves in the
marketplace by the outcomes under Providers they select, thereby undercutting uniformity among
registrars" and "severely impair[ing] the principle that the dispute resolution policy should be
uniform among registrars..."), available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/staff-report-29sept99.htm
(last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
40. Under UDRP Rule 15(a), a panel is directed to "decide a complaint on the basis of the
statements and documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy [and] Rules .. " However,
each panel is also permitted to consult "any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
UDRP Rules, supra note 16, at 15(a). Thus, the situations in which panels should consult and apply
one or more (unspecified) national trademark, unfair competition, or cybersquatting laws in addition
to the UDRP's autonomous rules is an important and unsettled issue.
41. See M. Scott Donahey, Adding Appeals Procedure to Dispute Resolution Might Satisfy
ICANN Critics, 6 ELEC. COMM. & L. REP. 33 (2001) (proposing UDRP appellate panel and
discussing its structure and jurisdiction); Experts Call For Right of Appeal in Domain Name Dispute
Resolution, 14 WIPO REP. 402 (2000) (discussing comments by experts participating in meeting
convened by WIPO). Conflicts (or at least tensions) among panel decisions have emerged in some
of the most controversial areas of UDRP practice, including cybergriping, domain names containing
personal names, and domains referring to geographic locations. Compare Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104 (Nov. 23, 2000) (refusing to order transfer
of domain name wallmartcanadasucks.com) with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Walsucks and Walmarket
Puerto Rico, WIPO Case No. D2000-0477 (July 20, 2000) (ordering transfer of virtually identical
domain name "walmartcanadasucks.com" owned by same respondent). See also Excelentisimo
Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. Barcelona.com Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0505 (Aug. 4, 2000)
(transferring geographic name); Roberts v. Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210 (May 29, 2000)
(transferring personal name); Winterson v. Hogarth, WIPO Case No. D2000-0235 (May 22, 2000)
(transferring personal name). But see Kur-und Verkehrsverein St. Moritz v. StMoritz.com, WIPO
Case No. D2000-0617 (Aug. 17, 2000) (refusing to transfer trademarked geographic name of Swiss
city to official organization representing that city where respondent provided information services
about such city); Gordon Sumner p/k/a Sting v. Urvan, WIPO Case No. D2000-596 (July 24, 2000)
As to the broader issue of whether to treat the UDRP as a new model for
non-national cyberspace dispute settlement, answering that question turns on
whether the UDRP contains any innovations that make it worthy of
emulation. In addition to the procedural advantages identified earlier, I see
three such innovations.
The first is that the UDRP may represent the leading edge of an non-
national 2 approach to intellectual property lawmaking and dispute
settlement, an approach that operates outside of, although not necessarily in
conflict with, the intellectual property treaty system and territorial national
laws. I have highlighted in this essay some of the hazards of this non-
national approach, but serving as a laboratory for experimenting with new
ways to mediate conflicts among divergent national laws is one of its
advantages. That governments see value in an non-national approach is
demonstrated by their enthusiastic endorsement of the Second WIPO
Domain Name Process, including support from the United States, which has
deferred expanding its own cybersquatting statute pending the outcome of
WIPO' s efforts. 3
As for the UDRP's second innovation, I see privatized bodies such as
ICANN as possessing the potential to more accurately reflect the preferences
of cyberspace communities than territorial nation states, and thus ultimately
having a genuine and competing claim to exercise rulemaking and dispute
settlement powers. I should stress, however, that it is far too early to
consider ICANN as anything even approaching a global cyberspace
parliament, given the many challenges to its legitimacy in the United States
and the European Union, ' and the paucity of voters in recent elections to the
ICANN Board. 5
(refusing to transfer domain name containing stage name of famous musician because musician's
actual name was different and also generic); Bruce Springsteen v. Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen
Fan Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532 (Jan. 25, 2001) (refusing to transfer brucespringsteen.com to
famous artist).
42. For a discussion of the term "non-national," see supra note 4.
43. Report to Congress: The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999 (Jan. 18,
2001) ("We believe that [the WIPO Process] will facilitate the development of important consensus
across jurisdictions regarding the protection of personal name disputes that occur online, and,
accordingly, we look forward to this process to shed light on these complex issues."), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/domainnamerep.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2001).
44. Senate to Scrutinize ICANN More Closely, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, (Feb. 14, 2001)
(noting that chair of Senate Commerce and Science Communications Subcommittee would review
ICANN more closely "after witnesses at a hearing called its legitimacy into question"), available at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,22210,00.html; see also Anthony Shadid, The Name
Game, THE BOSTON GLOBE, April 9, 2001, at 2-3, available aLhttp://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/
099/business/Thename.game+.shtml (last visited April 12, 2001) (discussing increasing skepticism
about ICANN's activities in the United States Congress as well as discussing New.net, a California
start-up company offering domain names not authorized by ICANN and making it easy to
reconfigure browsers to direct traffic to New.net sites).
45. Approximately 34,000 individuals voted for ICANN's at-large board of director slots, with
the voting heaviest in the Asian-Pacific region and Europe, and lightest in Africa, Central America,
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Finally, the UDRP was innovative in responding to cybersquatting not
by forcing an existing model to fit the problem at hand, but by crafting a
new, hybrid system that took some elements from international adjudication,
some elements from arbitration, and some elements from administrative
decisionmaking. It is that flexibility, and the rapidity with which it can
adapt to technological change, that might be worthy of emulation in other
cyberspace contexts. To take just one example, privatized dispute settlement
could be used to supplement national court adjudication of the copyright
infringement issues raised by the "notice and takedown" obligations
imposed upon Internet Service Providers in the United States and Europe. 6
In each of these areas, the challenge will be finding ways that will be
able to bolster the legitimacy of privatized systems like the UDRP without
jettisoning their advantages. Too rapid an evolution away from established
and accepted forms of lawmaking and dispute settlement may cause a
backlash against non-national structures by governments with competing
national interests. Indeed, it is only if those interests are accommodated
somewhere in the system that it will be possible to "grow" nascent private
institutions that might one day come to rival national or international ones.
and the Caribbean. See Marilyn Geewax, Moving beyond '.com' Expanded Domains, ATLANTA J. &
ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 5, 2000, at Al, available at 2000 WL 5485070; Jason Norwood-Young,
Ghanaian Voted as Voice of Africa on Net, AFR. NEWS SERV., Oct. 12, 2000.
46. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C); Directive 2000/31/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information
Society Services, In Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, arts. 12-14, and
Recitals 40-46, O.J. (L 178) 1, 6, 12-13 (providing that member states should encourage the
development of notice and takedown procedures by means of "voluntary agreement between all
parties concerned.").

